Vermont Supreme Court Hears Cases at VLS March 14

Summary: This case examines the extent to which Vermont’s restitution statute covers the payment of medical expenses by a third party on behalf of a crime victim. The victim in this case, a University of Vermont student, was at a bar in downtown Burlington one evening when he got into an argument with defendant Lucas Dwight. After the victim left the bar, defendant approached and “impacted” the victim’s face, causing severe damage to four of his teeth. Defendant was charged with simple assault, to which he pled nolo contendere. However, the parties disagreed as to the amount of restitution for the victim’s dental expenses. During a hearing on the matter, the victim’s father testified that he paid $21,000 in dental expenses to fix the victim’s teeth. Defendant argued that, while it was certainly laudable that a parent would want to cover his or her child’s medical expenses, the father was not a “victim” as defined in the restitution statute, which includes only those who sustain injury as the “direct result” of a crime or the family member of a minor, a person who has been found incompetent, or a homicide victim. The trial court disagreed and held that the victim’s uninsured medical bills—whether paid by his father or not—were a “direct result” of the crime and ordered restitution. Defendant’s argument on appeal mirrors his argument below: the restitution statute does not pertain to the victim’s father’s expenses because he is neither a direct victim nor the family member of a minor victim.                        

In re Kenneth Barber Jr. and consolidated cases; 2015-451 etc. (11 a.m.)
Should a guilty plea be overruled due to a new Vermont Supreme Court decision that states that plea deals should not be accepted without determining accuracy?

Summary: In Vermont state courts, the majority of criminal cases result in plea deals. Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) says that a court should not accept a plea deal without engaging in an inquiry sufficient to find that there is a factual basis for the plea—in other words, the plea must be accurate. In these four consolidated cases, each defendant was convicted of a crime after pleading guilty and is now serving the sentence set out in the defendant’s plea deal. The defendants argue that their convictions should be vacated because no factual basis was established for their plea according to Rule 11(f). Defendants’ arguments are heavily influenced by the Vermont Supreme Court’s recent decision, In re Anthony Bridger, 2017 VT 79, in which the Court determined that a plea agreement from 2009 did not comport with Rule 11(f). In doing so, the court found: (1) “substantial compliance” with Rule 11(f) was insufficient to demonstrate a defendant’s admission to all facts relevant to the charge, overturning some past caselaw; and (2) a defendant’s generic admission to unspecified facts in multiple affidavits covering numerous charges did not provide an adequate factual basis sufficient to support his guilty plea. The issue here is whether Bridger should be considered a “new” rule and applied retroactively to evaluate the trial court’s compliance with Rule 11(f) in each of the consolidated cases.

David Tanzer v. MyWebGrocer, Inc. How should MyWebGrocer’s “phantom stock”—hypothetical equity given to employees that became actual equity when the company converted from one business type to another—be valued? Was MyWebGrocer’s payout of phantom stock to a former employee a breach of contract or a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?